Introduction
Contemporary literature on the judicialization of politics highlights its global expansion across a vast range of legal jurisdictions. It traces the -spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules and procedures into the political sphere and policy-making fora and processes,‖ as well as -the expansion of the province of courts and judges in determining public policy outcomes, mainly through administrative review, judicial redrawing of bureaucratic boundaries between state organs, and -ordinary‖ rights jurisprudence. 
Part I. The Emergence of the Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan
A brief overview of Pakistan's past constitutional history is helpful to contextualize the nature of the judicialization of politics the country has witnessed. At the cost of three different constitutional arrangements reached in 1956, 1962, and 1973 , the military establishment and its civilian collaborators have routinely ushered different generals into power with their stark agendas and eventually aborted plans of political and social engineering. The coup-makers required regime legitimization and most judges were willing to oblige. Judicial legitimization of coups d"état was conjured from the sayings of Cicero -"salus populi supreme lex esto" (let the good of the people be the supreme law) or Henry de Bracton -‗illud, quod alias licitum non est necessitas facit licitum' (that which is not otherwise lawful, necessity makes lawful). (Islamic jurisprudence) that narrowly applied to certain areas of individual necessity were imaginatively upgraded as cogent parameters within the realm of state necessity. And, all of this, while principles belonging to criminal law or strictly applicable during times of war were found applicable to constitutional law or times of peace. 10 These interpretive feats were as novel as they were disingenuous. They contributed to sustaining a milieu characterized by a truncated constitutional culture, weak democratic norms and institutions, and, an underdeveloped discourse on rights and obligations. Their resulting legacy is that of a highly ‗unstable constitutionalism.'
Regime legitimization through judicial endorsement in the wake of direct martial rule during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s , and most recently in the 1990s is the most overt example of the judicialization of politics in Pakistan. In the interregnums between martial rule there have been pale reflections of democratic rule; often in the limited sense that governments were at least elected. These truncated stints of civilian rule between the long days and nights of the Generals have been plagued by acute insecurity. They were contested and destabilized by an artificial political class and -Kings' Parties‖ imagined and fashioned by the junta. They were characterized by weak governance further exacerbated by entrenched political and economic interests and frantic rent-seeking. The perennial civilian anxiety is unsurprising since no elected Pakistani government completed its tenure and handed the baton to the next one until 2013. 11 As a consequence, the strategic employment of courts to stabilize power and/or to destabilize the general elections held in May, 2013.
Osama Siddique, Judicialization of Politics: Pakistan Supreme Court"s Jurisprudence after the Lawyers" Movement, in UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM: LAW AND POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA (Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla eds., New York: Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming in 2015) (Please do no reproduce or circulate without the author's permission) 6 political opponents -since politics was fragmented and the judiciary increasingly politicizedhas been the norm rather than the exception. With majoritarian politics even more capricious than usual elsewhere, the law of the courts was molded into a potent tool for political perpetuation.
The 1990s presented an indirect and more pernicious mode of military control of politics.
Unstable constitutionalism and an undesirable judicialization of politics were its unavoidable outcomes. The military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq amended the Constitution, thereby allowing the President -an office that he had usurped -to sit in subjective judgment over the performance and fate of elected governments. Ushering in electoral democracy, albeit a tightly controlled one, had become unavoidable as Zia's regime eventually lost international and local collaborators.
Thus, Article 58(2)(b) allowed the President to dissolve the national assembly in his ‗discretion'
where in his ‗opinion,' ‗a situation had arisen in which the government of the Federation could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate was necessary.' 12 The adverse ramifications were deep and far-reaching. The basic structure of the 1973 Constitution fell into disarray. An essentially parliamentary form of government led by a Prime Minister and her Cabinet became a disharmonious hybrid with a very powerful, unaccountable, and increasingly partisan President.
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Between 1988 and 2007, four successive governments were dissolved by three different Presidents -the first being Zia himself, and the others having close links with the military establishment and its civilian allies. Each dissolution was taken to the courts, which were confronted with the ultimately political task of interpreting and applying a constitutional amendment that was completely at odds with the Constitution's ethos and overall framework.
The dissolutions were invariably mala fides, based on controversial facts and overbroad allegations. They took place in settings where the elected governments were weak, besieged by innumerable problems inherited from the martial law era and by parochial political opposition, with barely any time to settle down. 14 With the motivations for dissolution being blatantly political, it came as no surprise when the eventual judicial dispensations were equally political.
According to one study, not only did the purportedly objective legal and interpretive ‗test' to gauge the legitimacy of a dissolution change in an ad hoc manner from case to case -with as many as four different ‗tests' emerging in this short timeframe -but judges who employed one test to gauge the ambit of the presidential power in one particular case did not even adhere to the same ‗test' a few years later. The goal posts shifted remarkably rapidly.
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This new brand of the judicialization of politics -with constitutionally cloaked indirect control of political governments rather than regime legitimization after direct martial rule -lasted for almost a decade. In 2000, a unanimous twelve member bench of the Supreme Court hearing the Zafar Ali Shah case, including Justice Chaudhry, not only fashioned a protective umbrella of justifications for the coup -reemploying the much abused ‗doctrine of necessity' -but also echoed Musharraf's disdain for politics and supported his intention and proposed mechanisms for remedying matters.
At the same time, without the question having been posed, they further obliged by granting
Musharraf carte blanche power to amend the Constitution. 18 The underlying justification replicated other regime legitimization judgments of the past: -In such matters of extra constitutional nature, in order to save and maintain the integrity, sovereignty and stability of the country and having regard to the welfare of the people which is of paramount consideration for and subsequent growth of the Movement had much more to do with Musharraf's regime than it did with Justice Chaudhry. The latter was primarily a beneficiary -and perhaps at times even a captive -of events much larger than him. The Movement provided a focal point and platform for already significant political and social discontent against a ruler who was weaker and less assured than ever before -a General now lost in his labyrinth. The Movement brought together detractors and critics from across the political and social spectrum, who fuelled and sustained it.
Throughout the Movement, ‗Go Musharraf Go' and other anti-regime slogans were as ubiquitous as any pro-Chaudhry chants. The Movement remained anti-Musharraf throughout; it also became pro-Chaudhry, but in a residual, ancillary kind of way at first, and more pointedly at a later stage when Musharraf declared the Emergency and removed the judges en masse. Thereafter, Justice
Chaudhry evolved into the most visibly prominent symbol of defiance.
Third, in recent scholarship, some commentators have over-emphasized the narrow intent of the Movement, i.e. restoration of the deposed judges. For such analyses the larger transformation of the country's politics through the restoration of democracy was a byproduct. 41 In this vein, they further contend that no societal actor other than the lawyers presented a serious challenge to the regime during the Movement; hence the mobilization of the legal community also deserves primary credit for laying down necessary groundwork for the return of democracy. 42 The Movement was as much (if not more) supported, galvanized, and sustained by the political workers and civil society -in pursuit of democracy, constitutionalism, and civilian supremacydeliberately eclipsed role of political parties, which according to them, were the most significant force in the latter 
Judicialization of Politics
The period since the restoration of Justice Chaudhry and his colleagues is astonishing for its range and extent of judicial interventions. Even at this writing, many of its key features are still unfolding -or in some cases falling apart. ‗Judicial independence' was one of the resonant mantras of the Movement. Despite being frequently espoused in the post-restoration days to pursue strategic institutional goals of gaining turf, popularity, and power, ‗judicial independence's' inherent limitations and potential for obfuscation became all too evident. The new elected government was perceived as the primary competitor for public accolades by a resurgent judiciary ambitious enough to envision itself as the ultimate and completely autonomous custodian of not just law but also politics. The collateral victims of this institutional contestation were democratic and constitutional stability. As Anil Kalhan has recently observed:
[J]udicial independence is neither an all-or-nothing concept nor an end in itself.
With the return of civilian rule in Pakistan, a series of clashes between Parliament and the Supreme Court has raised concern that the same judiciary celebrated for challenging the military regime-while invoking exactly the same abstract notion of judicial independence-might now be asserting autonomy from weak civilian 46 Justice Chaudhry was the last of the deposed judges to be reinstated. For a good analysis of the various legal and political perspectives, tussles, and contestations that impeded the reinstatement of Justice Chaudhry and other deposed judges, and also the events and factors that led to their eventual return to the bench see ‗Gray Zone' Constitutionalism, at 56-61. However, the restored judiciary soon revealed its aspiration to invade the political space. The underlying judicial calculus is not fully explicable by conventional explanation of factors that allow the judicial organ to expand its ambit of operations -the expansion was neither the outcome of strategic use of courts by competing political forces nor was it in response to popular citizen demand. Notwithstanding the existence of some enabling factors, the expansion was predominantly a function of unilateral judicial ambition to intervene in mega-politics.
47 See 'Gray Zone' Constitutionalism, at 2.
48 Recent scholarship has again highlighted the Pakistani military establishment and its civilian allies' (the ‗deep state') legal, political and institutional steps to ensure preservation of their various interests during periods of civilian rule -a process referred to as ‗transformative preservation.' It elaborates on the establishment's aggressive manipulation of the political process; an effective ‗colonization' of the state's administrative process; the creation of a vast economic empire; and, considerable influence over the media. These entrenchments have been supplemented, justified and reinforced through an antidemocratic legitimizing discourse, and, the military's self-projection as the country's most competent institution, not just in security matters but also in governance and development, see ‗Gray Zone' Constitutionalism, at 14-23. 
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The essentially judge-driven judicialization of politics most prominently manifested itself in the Chaudhry Court's preoccupation with holding the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) led coalition government accountable at several levels, most notably, governance, policy-making, legislation, regulation, and administration. The principal example was its legal autopsy of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (‗NRO') -a transitional mechanism extending controversial amnesty to politicians from multiple Musharraf era criminal cases as well as a workable modus for
Musharraf's eventual exit from Pakistani politics. It is noteworthy that elections and transition to civilian rule did successfully take place due to this arguably unavoidable pragmatic deal-making to reassure insecure politicians as well as a fading autocrat. It would be naïve to imagine that the process of restoring a derailed democracy was going to be anything but political or that the transition would involve a clean break with the past and could be achieved without laborious negotiations with Musharraf and his allies as well as U.S assurances for his future.
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Admittedly, the resulting arrangements had several political fallouts, such as adverse ramifications for the ruling party's political and moral credibility as well as straining relations among the political parties that benefited from the NRO and those that did not. 50 The Chaudhry Court, however, was not content with mere political ramifications. The NRO provided it a tremendous opportunity for stirring populist support, scoring political points, and gaining moral ascendancy. Hence, the NRO was dramatically dismantled -seventeen judges and a 287 page judgment was overkill given that the controversial arrangement could have been struck down on the narrower ground of unconstitutional extension of protection to an arbitrarily defined set of custodian of political morality and integrity. In this regard it is quite telling that in its judgment the Chaudhry Court felt comfortable using lines of argument, parameters, and rhetoric similar to that employed by the military in the past for characterizing politicians as corrupt and emphasizing its self-appointed duty to uproot corruption. 52 Ironically, it even regurgitated past chronicles of political corruption, benchmarks of uprightness, and personal piety tests, from judgments, laws, and frameworks that directly owed their existence to military rule.
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The Chaudhry Court also appeared oblivious to the fact that both the judiciary and the democratic system shared a traumatic past, had grievously suffered under dictators, and were taking uncertain new steps towards some modicum of stability and redemption. While the Movement was conveniently deemed to have washed away the past sins of the restored judges who themselves had once struck an unholy deal with Musharraf, the transgressions of the NRO beneficiaries, who had ultimately ensured the restoration of both the judiciary and democracy, were regarded as unforgivable. At the same time, the Chaudhry Court removed over seventy judges who had been appointed during Justice Chaudhry's absence as Chief Justice both before and after the restoration of democracy. 54 While anointing themselves as cleansed, the Chaudhry Court's judges were unwilling to extend ratification to judges who (like them) had opted to take oath under Musharraf and even those who were clearly ‗purer,' having been appointed under the Constitution by a civilian President. The effect was to strip the judiciary of many seasoned jurists.
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Once the Chaudhry Court assailed the NRO arrangements, it also opened up the door for it to demand that the government proceed against the new civilian President of the country -also the 
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Chaudhry Court has invariably pursued popularity and aggressively extended the boundaries of judicial review to the extent that there now seem to be no boundaries. 58 It has, for example, assailed a constitutional amendment (discussed below) and raised legal questions about the accumulation of rainwater outside the Supreme Court registry in Lahore after a heavy monsoon downpour.
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There is now a vast literature on the emergence and evolution of PIL in South Asia, the activist role played by judges, their justifications for it, and the various tools and strategies employed by 
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a government is expected to run without taxation); a popular kite flying festival and large wedding banquets (provoking queries about whether social regulation, public awareness, and appropriate legislation based on public choices ought to have prevailed instead); media regulation (attracting the criticism that media ought to be allowed to self-regulate and/or negotiate with the national media regulator instead); power outages, electricity breakdowns, and delayed airplane flights (involving issues of optimal administration, policy-making and institutional management in technical areas routinely left to governments and domain experts); specific episodes of crimes against women and extrajudicial killings (drawing condemnation to certain heinous actions but neither providing systemic and long-range solutions nor empowering the lower judiciary to institutionally deal with these crimes); sale of national assets (often raising complex economic, financial, political, governance, and policy issues unsuitable for purely legal prescriptions); unauthorized diversion of flood waters (with neither floods nor their supervision conceivably manageable by courts); and, deteriorating law and order situations in Karachi and the province of Baluchistan (given the complexity of politics and governance involved, quite predictably the outcome has been nothing more than the summoning and chastisement of various high officials sometimes accompanied by ineffectual directions).
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In this context, the Chaudhry Court has been further criticized for often glossing over how individual cases precisely meet the constitutional requirement that the cases raise a ‗question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights.'
Additionally, an increasingly voiced concern is that to fit in all kinds of cases under the Article Recently, the International Commission of Jurists recommended that, -The Supreme Court also ought to identify criteria for the decision to take up cases suo motu. These rules may be somewhat more flexible than those governing the allocation of cases to Chambers,‖ and that, -As far as the substance of these latter rules is concerned, they should take into account that suo motu procedures must be and remain an exceptional exercise of powers.‖ President. The memorandum ostensibly sought U.S. assistance against an apprehended military coup and support for civilian takeover of key military assets. 65 The Chaudhry Court admitted a petition under Article 184 (3) declaring it both a matter of ‗public importance' (which prima facie it was) and ‗violative of Fundamental Rights under the Constitution' (which was fairly tenuous). Maintainability was key and strongly contested but the nine member bench found that a prima facie case for the enforcement of Articles 9, 14 and 19 (A) of the Constitution had been made out because:
The attempt/act of threatening to the dignity of the people, collectively or individually, concerning the independence, sovereignty and security of their country, prima facie, raises a serious question tagged/linked with their fundamental rights. The existence of Memo dated 10 th May, 2011 may have effects of not only compromising national sovereignty but also its dignity. The loyal citizens have shown great concern, to live in the comity of nations with dignity and honour, as according to expanded meanings of ‗life', the citizens have a right to ask the State to provide safety to their lives from internal as well as external threats.
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As to the argument that the matter involved was purely political, the Court summed up:
This ‗political question doctrine' is based on the respect for the Constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers among the organs of the State. But where in a case the Court has jurisdiction to exercise power of judicial review, the fact that it involves political question, cannot compel the Court to refuse its determination. In view of the above discussion it is held that this Court enjoys jurisdiction to proceed in all those matters which are justiciable. However, if there is an issue, which is alleged to be non-justiciable it would be the duty of the Court to examine each case in view of its facts and circumstances, and then to come to the conclusion whether it is non-justiciable or otherwise.
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Critics vociferously rejected this circular reasoning. They pointed out that the controversy had direct nexus with structural issues relating to civil-military relations and required a political and not a judicial resolution. They further stressed that the ill-defined and military-centric notion of ‗national security' allegedly at stake due to the memorandum did not even remotely fall within the ambit of the Fundamental Rights cryptically mentioned by the Supreme Court.
68 They added, -The fact that the Court did not even deign to raise the issue of maintainability of the memo issue when it first came to the Court indicates how trigger-happy our judges have become in encroaching upon the representative branches of government.' 69 Some political commentators wondered whether the entire ‗drama' around imperiled national security was orchestrated to destabilize democracy and to divert attention from the red-faced military establishment in the wake of the US operation against Osama bin Laden. 70 Others voiced dismay over the waste of time and resources that could have been used to address thousands of pending cases. 71 Some drew attention to the fact that if Ijaz were to be believed then his more damaging assertions that the Pakistani security services were contemplating a coup also needed to be taken cognizance of -the two claims stood or fell together -and yet were not. 72 Others exhorted against the dubious authenticity of the memorandum and argued that its existence was unlikely because a What followed was a media circus, attempts at summoning ambassador Haqqani (which eventually worked, though he then left and refused to return) as well as Mansoor Ijaz (which failed, making those taking him seriously indignant), 74 exhortations by the parliament to leave a purely political matter to the politicians, appointment of a judicial commission comprising of three provincial chief justices to determine the, ‗origin, authenticity, and purpose' of the memorandum even though a parliamentary commission had already been set up for that task, frequent judicial outbursts at lack of headway, and belated forays by the main opposition party and the military to capitalize on the scandal to destabilize an already tottering government. The fact that neither strategic moves by political players nor public demand had provoked this We must distance ourselves from the erroneous view that regards judges as the representatives of the people and as accountable to the people much like the legislature is. Judges are not representatives of the people and it would be a tragedy if they became so … It is sufficient that the judiciary reflects the different values that are accepted in society, and it should have an accountability that reflects its independence and its special role in a democracy. To find the will of the people, we, as Judges, are not required to embark upon any theoretical journey in the realm of abstract political philosophy or to try finding solutions to legal conundrums in alien constitutional dispensations materially different from ours; we need only examine our own Constitution to ensure that the people of Pakistan, the political sovereigns, are obeyed and their will, as manifested in the Constitution, prevails. This after all is the very essence of a democratic order. …Pity the nation that elects a leader as a redeemer but expects him to bend every law to favour his benefactors Pity the nation whose leaders seek martyrdom through disobeying the law than giving sacrifices for the glory of law and who see no shame in crime. Pity the nation that is led by those who laugh at the law little realizing that the law shall have the last laugh. Pity the nation that launches a movement for rule of law but cries foul when the law is applied against its bigwig that reads judicial verdicts through political glasses and that permits skills of advocacy to be practised more vigorously outside the courtroom than inside.
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One of the most problematic aspects of the Chaudhry Court's overreaching activism was its selfdriven scrutiny of the parliament's constitution-making powers soon after democracy was Doubts persist over the maintainability of the matter under Article 184(3), the Court's appointment of a controversial one-man commission to investigate the matter, as well as the neutrality of its adjudication by two judges known to be close to Justice Chaudhry (they heard the case after he eventually recused himself). 102 The judges characterized the matter as a politically motivated conspiracy from the start, invoked the narrative of the Movement to extol the integrity of judges rather than meaningfully address the factual questions before them, and took additional steps and made comments that were widely perceived as over-protective of the accused. pressure propelled them into such embroilment. On the contrary, the judges have calculated and grasped the potential opportunities that such interventions present to occupy center stage and thereby progressively extend the ambit of judicial review, consolidate constituencies in the media and legal bars, build public support for their activism, and assume legal, political, and moral supremacy over the arbitration of matters of national significance -despite tenuous jurisdictional justifications and increasing criticism from diverse quarters. This is in contrast to historical factors for the judicialization of politics in Pakistan where the judiciary was coerced or co-opted in mega-politics by dictators or unavoidable political crises.
While engaging in unrestrained activism, the Chaudhry Court has also endeavored to ensure that its interventions are widely publicized and celebrated. Furthermore, certain judges have shown a propensity for self promotion. Their own Code of Conduct that says, -Functioning as he does in full view of the public, a Judge gets thereby all the publicity that is good for him. He should not seek more. In particular, he should not engage in any public controversy, least of all on a political question, notwithstanding that it involves a question of law,‖ has long become of mere academic value. 104 The fact that the suo motu jurisdiction in particular has been the standard modus operandi for assuming jurisdiction demonstrates that this type of judicialization of politics is fundamentally self-driven; even in typical PIL cases there are after all particular sectional interests in society that approach the court.
The initial public support for the Chaudhry Court in the wake of the Movement is an inadequate explanation for its subsequent trajectory. The Movement was an amalgamation of diverse antiautocracy forces and the sustenance and consolidation of the democratic process was a greater priority for it as compared to abstract notions of judicial independence. When the Chaudhry Court opted for high profile duels with the government as the vehicle for institutional profile building and power accumulation, it started alienating many significant sections of its supporters from the Movement days, especially as it neglected its various promises to reform the overall system of justice for the benefit of ordinary people. Neither has it been able to sustain the loyalty of luminaries and foot soldiers from the legal fraternity. 105 Over the years, prominent leaders of the Movement have publicly parted ways and openly disparaged its key judgments. Elected officeholders of major bar associations now represent collectives of lawyers irate at its unrestrained activism and embroilment in controversies, and the media routinely engages in uninhibited critique of debatable aspects of its demeanor and jurisprudence. At times, it has waved the stick of ‗contempt of court' at some of the more irreverent critics but that has only provoked defiance. 106 That the great judiciary-lawyer alliance is now deeply fragmented is an understatement -the Lahore High Court Bar Association recently filed references before the Supreme Judicial Council against four apex court judges, including Justice Chaudhry, seeking proceedings for misconduct and removal from office on the grounds of misusing the Court for personal and political ends. Chaudhry Court has brought the judiciary to the heart of several divisive national discourses and contestations. Any major immediate retreat to the periphery of mega-politics would be difficult to achieve, even if attempted. Meanwhile, allegations of self-promotion and politicking are more strident and uninhibited than ever before. Whether they linger on or withdraw, the judiciary is so inextricably caught up in the political life of Pakistan that further constitutional instability is likely the future.
